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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXPORT SUBSIDIES: COUNTERVAILING DUTIES-Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
In April 1970, Zenith Radio Corporation filed a petition with the
Commissioner of Customs' alleging that Japan had bestowed a "bounty
or grant" upon the export of certain consumer electronic products2
through the remission of commodity taxes' that would have been im-
posed 4 had the products been sold in Japan. Petitioner, pursuant to
section 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5 requested an assessment of
The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to make counter-
vailing duty determinations to the Commissioner of Customs, subject to the Secretary's
approval. The complaint was filed pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 16.24(b) (1970) (currently
appearing at 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b) (1977)).
2 The products included television receivers, radios, phonograph combinations,
radio tape recorder combinations, record players and phonographs, complete with
amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders, tape players, and color television tubes. Notice
of Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,087, as amended by 37 Fed.
Reg. 11,487 (1972).
1 Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, a variety of consumer goods, in-
cluding the electronics products at issue here, are subject to an "indirect tax," a tax
levied on the goods themselves and computed as a percentage of the manufacturer's
sales price rather than the income of purchaser or seller. The tax applies to both goods
manufactured in Japan and those imported into Japan. On goods manufactured in
Japan the tax is levied on shipments from the factory; imported products are taxed
when they are withdrawn from the customs warehouse. Only goods destined for con-
sumption in Japan are subject to the tax. However, products shipped for export are
exempt, and any tax paid is refunded if the product is exported. Thus, the tax is
"remitted" on exports.
4 For the products at issue here the rate of taxation ranges from 5 to 20 percent.
TAX BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Japan), AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAXES 128-29
(1970).
I Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). Section 303, as amended,
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), states in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province or other political
subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or cor-
poration, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant
upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise
manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or
other political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of such
article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be im-
ported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether
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countervailing duties on those products upon their entry into the
United States. In January 1976, after soliciting the views of interested
parties and conducting an investigation, the acting Commissioner of
Customs published, "Notice of Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, '6 rejecting Petitioner's request. Petitioner then filed
suit in the United States Customs Court contesting the determination
under section 516(d) of the Tariff Act.7 The Customs Court,8 on cross-
such articles or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when ex-
ported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases,
in addition to any duties otherwise imported, a duty equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
(5) The Secretary shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or
estimate, the net amount of such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net
amount so determined or estimated.
(6) The Secretary shall make all regulations he deems necessary for the iden-
tification of articles and merchandise subject to duties under this section and
for the assessment and collection of such duties. All determinations by the
Secretary under this section, and all determinations by the Commission under
subsection (b)(1) of this section (whether affirmative or negative) shall be
published in the Federal Register.
6 The Notice stated in relevant part that:
[O]n the basis of the facts gathered and the investigation conducted pursuant
to customs regulations, a final determination is hereby made . . . that .. .
no bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed directly or indirectly within the
meaning of § 303 . .. upon the . . .exportation of certain consumer elec-
tronics products from Japan.
Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
1 Tariff Act of 1930, § 516(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976). Section 516(d), as
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976), states in pertinent part:
(d) Within 30 days after a determination by Secretary-
(1) under section 160 of this article that a class or kind of foreign
merchandise is not being, nor likely to be sold in the United States
at less than its fair value, or
(2) under section 303 of this title that a bounty or grant is not being
paid or bestowed, an American manufacturer, producer, or
wholesaler of merchandise of the same class or kind as that described
in such determination may file with the Secretary a written notice of
a desire to contest such determination. Upon receipt of such notice
the Secretary shall cause a publication to be made thereof and of
such manufacturer's, producer's, or wholesaler's desire to contest the
determination. Within 30 days after such publication such manu-
facturer, producer, or wholesaler may commence an action in the
United States Customs Court contesting such determination.
8 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977). For a
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motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of Petitioner and
ordered the assessment of countervailing duties on all Japanese con-
sumer products specified in the complaint. 9 The Customs Court based
its decision on Downs v. United States. 10 On appeal, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) distinguished Downs," and, in a
three to two decision, reversed the lower court. 12 The CCPA relied
primarily upon the long standing and uniform interpretation of section
303(a) by the Department of the Treasury.'" The United States
Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed the holding of the CCPA that
the remission of commodity taxes on certain consumer electronic pro-
ducts by Japan does not constitute a "bounty or grant" under section
303 of the Tariff Act of 930.14
American manufacturers were first afforded protection against ex-
port subsidies conferred by foreign governments under the Tariff Act
of 1897.'5 This legislation directed the Secretary of the Treasury to im-
pose a countervailing duty upon the importation of "any article or
merchandise . . . upon which a bounty or grant has been bestowed.' 6
brief review of the Custom Court's other considerations, see 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 577 (1978).
9 430 F. Supp. at 249. Relying heavily on broad tax remission language in
Downs v. United States, note 10 infra, the Customs Court held that the Japanese
remission constituted a "bounty or grant" as a matter of law.
10 Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903). The case held that an export
"bounty" had been conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the regulation of
sugar production and sale involving remission of excise taxes in the event of export, as
well as a transferable export certificate. The value of this certificate was based on the
difference between the domestic and foreign market prices of sugar at the time of
export.
11 The majority distinguished Downs on the ground that it did not decide the
question of whether a non-excessive remission of an indirect tax, standing alone con-
stitutes a bounty or grant. The majority emphasized that the Russian scheme was com-
posed of two inseparable elements: the transferable certificate of substantial market
value and the remission of the excise tax.
1 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
"1 Id. at 1218-23.
14 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151.
16 The language of the 1897 statute evolved out of two earlier countervailing duty
provisions that were applicable only to sugar imports. See Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat.
584 (1890). Section 5 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 205, provided in full:
That whenever any country, dependency, or colony shall pay or bestow,
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article
or merchandise from such country, dependency, or colony, and such article
1979
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Although the statute has been reenacted five times without modifica-
tion, the Congress has never provided a definition for the term "bounty
or grant."17 Based on its view of the Congressional intent, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury adopted its own interpretation of the term
"bounty or grant," less than one year after the passage of the Act. 8
For over eighty years, the Treasury has maintained the position
that a "bounty or grant"' 9 is not conferred by an indirect tax 20 remis-
sion unless it is excessive. In the Department's terminology, a remission
is excessive only if it exceeds the amount of tax paid or otherwise
or merchandise is dutiable under the provisions of this Act, then upon the
importation of any such article or merchandise into the United States,
whether the same shall be imported in the same condition as when exported
from the country of production or has been changed in condition by
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases,
in addition to the duties otherwise imposed by this Act, an additional duty
equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid
or bestowed. The net amount of all such bounties or grants shall be from
time to time ascertained, determined, and declared by the Secretary of the
Treasury, who shall make all needful regulations for the identification of
such article and merchandise and for the assessment and collection of such
additional duties.
17 The current version of section 303 represents the fifth reenactment of the 1897
provision without any modifications relevant here. Tariff Act of 1909, § 6, 36 Stat. 85;
Tariff Act of 1913, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 193; Tariff Act of 1922, § 303, 42 Stat. 935;
Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 46 Stat. 687; Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2049.
The Customs Simplification Act of 1951, H.R. 1535, introduced at the request of
the Secretary of the Treasury, would have amended section 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930 to agree with the Treasury's interpretation of the term "bounty or grant." The
Congress rejected this Amendment as well as a similar provision recommended by the
State Department. Hearings on H.R. 1535 before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 16, 35 & 79 (1951); Hearings on H.R. 1612 before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1951).
'8 See T.D. 19,321, 1 TREAS. DEC. 696 (1898).
19 The Treasury's interpretation of the terms "bounty or grant" is derived from
language in the Tariff Act of 1897 providing for the levying of duties on sugar imports
equal to the "net amount" of bounty or grant. This concept of "net bounty" as
adopted in the Tariff Act of 1897 suggests that the Congress envisioned that only a
remission in excess of taxes paid or otherwise due would, trigger the countervailing duty
requirements. See 30 CONG. REc. 1721 (1897).
20 The term "indirect tax" refers to those taxes on the product itself rather than
on a person or entity. See Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to
Trade, 7 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 327, 351 (1975).
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due." This position has been incorporated into articles VI and XVIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2" Both the
Treasury's position and the international standard embodied in the
GATT are based on the principle that because exports are not con-
sumed in the country of production, they should not be subject to con-
sumption or indirect taxes2 4 in that country. The premise follows that
insofar as the sale of foreign goods in the United States is subject to
federal excise and state and local sales taxes, the application of a
countervailing duty would have the effect of double taxation.2 s This
view is considered a narrow approach to the effects of export subsidiza-
tion by most commentators and economists.
2 6
The courts have taken a more expansive view of the application of
United States countervailing duty law and its controlling language
"bounty or grant." The broadest judicial interpretation of the term
21 Thus, for example, if a $5.00 tax is levied on goods at a factory, the return of
$5.00 upon exportation would be "nonexcessive," whereas a payment of $8.00 from the
government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be "excessive" by $3.00.
22 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pt. 5 at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. Arti-
cle VI(3) provides in pertinent part:
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product . . . in excess of the
amount of subsidy determined to have been granted . . . the term "counter-
vailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the pur-
pose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon
the manufacture, production or export of merchandise.
Id. art. XVI, para. 4 provides in pertinent part:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the
like product when destined for domestic consumption, on the remission of
such duties or taxes in amount not in excess of those which have accrued
shall not be deemed a subsidy.
213 See generally K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970).
24 Indirect taxes are those on special goods and include consumption, sales, ex-
cise or turnover taxes. Direct taxes are those on a person or entity and include income
and social security taxes. See Marks & Malgren, supra note 20, at 351.
21 This principle regarding double taxation was the economic basis of the 1897
Statute. Tariff Act of 1897, note 16 supra.
21 See e.g., Marks & Malmgren, supra note 20, at 351-55; THE UNITED STATES
SUBMISSION OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT (1966); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 210-16 (1970); Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export
Subsidization: A Re-Emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82
(1968).
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"bounty or grant" is found in the dicta of two early Supreme Court
opinions.27 In Downs v. United States,28 the Court reviewed a Russian
export scheme, which, while imposing a tax on all sugar produced,
remitted the tax on all sugar exported.2 9 In upholding the Treasury's
imposition of countervailing duties upon the importation of Russian
sugar, the Court stated: "When a tax is imposed upon all sugar pro-
duced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever pro-
cess, or in whatever manner or under whatever name it is disguised, it
is a bounty upon exportation. '" 3 0
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court in G. S. Nicholas & Co. v.
United States,3' examined a British tax plan which provided rebates to
distillers upon the export of spirits. In concluding that the British
scheme fell within the ambit of the United States statute, the Court
stated:
A word of broader significance than "grant" could not have been used
[by the Congress]. Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow" it expresses
a concession, the conferring of something by one person upon
another. And if "something" be conferred by a country "upon the ex-
portation of any article or merchandise" a countervailing duty is re-
quired .... 32
The dicta in Downs33 and G. S. Nicholas3 4 suggest that the term
"bounty or grant" applies to all tax remissions, direct as well as in-
direct. The holdings on the other hand, stand for the limited proposi-
tion that a "bounty or grant" exists only to the extent that a govern-
ment conferred remission exceeds the taxes otherwise due. Consistent
with long standing administrative practice' s and the GATT, the
21 Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
28 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
29 See note 10 supra.
30 187 U.S. at 515.
" 249 U.S. 34 (1919). The British scheme involved payment to an exporter of
spirits from the United Kingdom the sum of three to five pence per gallon. Id. at
36-37.
3 Id. at 39.
s 187 U.S. at 502.
s 249 U.S. at 39. In neither Downs nor Nicholas did the Supreme Court decide
the issue of whether a non-excessive remission of an indirect tax standing alone would
constitute a "bounty or grant."
" See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
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Department of the Treasury has construed the Downs and G. S.
Nicholas cases in accordance with the holdings, rather than dicta. The
apparent conflict between the administrative interpretation of the
statute and the dicta espoused in those cases has remained unresolved
through the successive reenactments of section 303 by the Congress.
American importers since the inception of the Tariff Act of 1930
have enjoyed the statutory right to contest countervailing duty
assessments in the United States Court of Customs and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.3 6 It was not until 196731 that an
American manufacturer sought to contest a Treasury Department
"negative countervailing duty determination. 38  In United States v.
Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 3 9 the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an appeal of a
negative countervailing duty determination under the Tariff Act of
1930. The decision rested largely on recognition of the policy implica-
tions of countervailing duty impositions.40 The court reasoned that ab-
sent an explicit provision for judicial review, the Congress had not in-
tended that United States manufacturers by-pass the executive branch
through a judicial proceeding. 4 In direct response to Hammond Lead
Products the Congress, in the Trade Act of 1974,42 provided American
36 Such challenges are brought pursuant to procedures outlined in section 516 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976).
s1 Every countervailing duty case prior to 1967 was brought by an importer. See,
e.g., United States v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16 (1897); F.W. Woolworth v. United
States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
11 Hammond Lead Prod. Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 460 (Gust. Ct.
1969), rev'd, 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
39 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
40 Id. at 1030.
41 Id. at 1031.
42 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976)).
In reporting out the amended bill, the Senate Finance Committee Report (S. REP. No.
92-1221, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972)) stated:
The Committee Amendments providing judicial review to domestic producers
in countervailing duty cases is necessitated because of a 1971 decision of the
Court of Customs and Patents Appeals (United States v. Hammond Lead
Products, Inc.) holding that judicial review was not available to American
producers in countervailing duty cases. The Committee is concerned that the
decision might affect the ability of American producers to obtain meaningful
relief against subsidized import competition . . .because of administrative in-
action or insufficient action, or because of excessive delay in the adminis-
trative process.
1979
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manufacturers with the right to judicially contest negative countervail-
ing duty determinations. 3
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, is the first case to be tried
under the courts' expanded jurisdiction. In Zenith, the Court was not
faced with a question requiring a review of the record or a factual in-
quiry as to the effect of Japanese tax remission on the subject con-
sumer products. 44 Petitioner did not dispute that the Treasury's
negative determination was based solely on its long standing position
that a non-excessive remission of an indirect tax is not a "bounty or
grant." Further, Petitioner conceded that the Japanese tax remission
was both indirect and non-excessive in nature. 4s The sole "question,"
as the Court phrased it, was "whether the Department's interpretation
is sufficiently reasonable to be accepted by a reviewing court.."46
At the outset, the Court adopted a deferential standard of review,
affording "considerable weight" to the Treasury's long standing ad-
ministrative practice. 47 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court
found that the legislative history may not have compelled the Treasury
0 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976). In mandating judicial review of exporter protests
the Act is silent as to the standard of review to be employed. Language in the Senate
Finance Committee report on the bill, note 42 supra, suggests that the Congress con-
templated that exporters be afforded the same standard of review that has been ap-
plied with respect to importer protests. Although the Customs Court and CCPA have
not consistently articulated a standard of review in these cases, standards specified
under the Administrative Procedures Act have been applied. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., §
701 et seq. (1976). In Entergetic Worsted v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust.
Ct. 1963), rev'd, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966), the court applied an arbitrary and capricious
standard in upholding the Treasury's determination as the amount of "bounty" confer-
red upon "worsted wool tops" exported from Uruguay. On appeal, the CCPA
employed the substantial evidence test to reverse the Customs Court and Treasury
determination. 53 C.C.P.A. at 42, 45-46.
44 The queston of whether a non-excessive tax remission should be included
under the term "bounty or grant" involves review as a matter of law. See generally K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-30.14 (1958).
41 98 S. Ct. at 244.
46 Id. at 2445.
41 Id. The Court stated:
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great
deference to the interpretation of the statute by officers or the agency charged
with its administration. To sustain [an agency's] application of [a] statutory
term, we need not find that it is the only reasonable one, or even that it is
the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance
in judicial proceedings.
Id. at 2445.
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to adopt its position. 48 He concluded, however, that the Treasury's in-
terpretation is "reasoanble in light of the statutory purpose" and
"repeated Congressional reenactment of the statute without modifica-
tion." 49 The Downs and G. S. Nicholas cases were distinguished by the
Court on the ground that neither involved the issue of whether a non-
excessive remission of indirect taxes, standing alone5" would have con-
stituted a "bounty or grant" upon export. 5'
The Court's deference to the Treasury's interpretation is consistent
with a line of decisions in which the Supreme Court has chosen not to
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency or depart-
ment. 2 In Zenith, the Court had cogent reasons for deferring to the
Treasury's administrative practice.53 Among these reasons are the com-
plexity of issues surrounding the imposition of countervailing duties,5 4
the comparative expertise of the Treasury with respect to tariff and
non-tariff trade barriers, and "the lack, internationally, of any satisfac-
48 Id. at 2448.
49 Id.
50 In Downs, the Russian Sugar scheme encompassed a non-excessive remission of
consumption taxes as well as the granting of export certificates, entitling the bearer to
additional rebates. The bounty conferred in Downs resided n the value of the export
certificates in conjunction with the tax remission. As the Zenith court recognized, the
Downs decision is not dispositive of the question here. In G.S. Nicholas, the only ques-
tion before the Court was whether a direct bounty on exportation of liquor from Great
Britain was a "bounty or grant;" the Court did not address the question of whether
non-excessive remission of an indirect tax fell within the statute.
51 Marshall's treatment of the dicta in Downs and G.S. Nicholas puts to rest any
doubts raised with respect to judicial interpretation of the term "bounty or grant." 98
S. Ct. at 2451.
52 Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 374 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
193 (1969); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
13 The exercise of a reviewing court's discretion in choosing between substitution
of judgment and adoption of a deferential review standard is influenced by many fac-
tors that usually remain inarticulate, including the court's attitude toward the agency,
the need for stability of a particular law or policy, the comparative qualifications of
courts and agency to decide the particular issue and the extent to which the legislative
body has committed particular problems to administrative or judicial determination.
See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 44, at §§ 30.05-.14.
54 Because countervailing duty impositions tend to strain United States relations
with the country against which the imposition is made, foreign policy considerations
are significant. Moreover, imposition of a countervailing duty always carries with it the
risk, of retaliatory measures by United States trading partners.
1979
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tory agreement, on what constitutes a fair as opposed to unfair [export]
subsidy." s5 While each of these factors may have influenced the deci-
sion, careful analysis of the opinion reveals that the only major
justification for the Court's deference to the Treasury's interpretation
was its recognition of the need to maintain stability in the inter-
national framework of trade agreements embodied in the GATT. In
this regard the Court stated:
The [Treasury's] position has been incorporated into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is followed by every
major trading nation in the world; foreign tax systems as well as
private expectations thus have been built on the assumption that
countervailing duties would not be imposed on nonexcessive remissions
of indirect taxes. In light of these substantial reliance interests, the
long-standing administrative construction of the statute should not be
disturbed .... 56
In the Court's view, these "substantial reliance interests," outweighed
findings acknowledged in the Trade Act of 1974,51 which suggest that
the economic underpinnings of articles VI and XVI of the GATT, and
thus the Treasury's position, are faulty.58
Under both the GATT and United States countervailing duty law,
indirect tax remissions, unless excessive, are not countervailable. This
position is based on the economic assumption that indirect taxes are
shifted forward and reflected in a product's purchase price.59 This
assumption has come under attack by economists of the view that in-
direct taxes are often not fully shifted forward. 60 They suggest that
11 98 S. Ct. at 2449. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974).
16 98 S. Ct. at 2449.
"' Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976).
58 In its report transmitting the Trade Act of 1974 to the House, the Committee
of Ways and Means commented:
GATT provisions on tax adjustments in international trade should be revised
to ensure that they are trade neutral. Present provisions permit adjustments
on traded goods for certain direct taxes but not for indirect taxes. The Com-
mittee expects that the President will seek modification of present rules as
would remove any disadvantage to countries like the United States relying
primarily on direct taxes and put all countries on an equal footing.
Trade Reform: Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2171 (1973).
19 K. DAMM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
214 (1970).
60 Id. at 214-16.
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since the United States is one of the few countries where indirect taxes
are a primary revenue source, foreign exporters in countries where in-
direct taxes are a primary revenue source 6 are able to receive tax
remissions, far greater than American exporters, without fear of
countervailing duties under GATT rules or United States law.6 2
Recognition by the Congress of this line of economic reasoning is
found in section 121(a)(5) of the Trade Act of 1974. This section
directs the President to take action to bring about "the revision of
GATT articles with respect to the treatment of border adjustments for
internal taxes to redress the disadvantage to countries relying primarily
on indirect taxes for revenue needs."63 Whether or not the economics
upon which section 121(a)(5) is premised are valid, it is clear that the
Congress disapproved through the Trade Act of the different treat-
ment presently afforded direct and indirect tax remissions under the
GATT. Assuming that GATT rules do not operate to the disadvantage
of American manufacturers, then, in keeping with the statutory pur-
pose of the earlier enacted trade laws, that disadvantage should be
remedied. As the Zenith Court recognized, the reciprocal nature of
trade agreements and tariff bindings requires that any such disadvan-
tage be remedied, through international agreement rather than through
judicial intervention. 64 In this sense, the Court's opinion is consistent
with the Trade Act's mandate that resolution of the issue be sought
through multilateral negotiation.
The alternative, adoption of a statutory remedy through modifica-
tion of the United States law, has been repeatedly rejected by the Con-
gress in the prospect of retaliatory measures by American trading part-
ners and in the hope of reaching an international solution through
61 These indirect taxes are comprised, principally, of consumption, turnover, ex-
cise and sales taxes. See note 24 supra.
" This view is based on a study by the staff of the Senate Committee on
Finance. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., FOREIGN TRADE: A
SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES TO BE STUDIED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INT'L TRADE
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 6 (Comm. Print 1971). For an additional
study supporting the views of the Senate Committee on Finance, see Marks &
Malmgren, supra note 20, at 353.
s Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976).
64 The recognition by Congress of the need to resolve such issues through inter-
national agreement is also found in section 1303(d)(2) of the Trade Act. The section
provides the Treasury with discretion to suspend imposition of countervailing duties
even where a bounty or grant has been found to exist. In order for suspension of the
countervailing duty to be authorized, the following conditions are required: (1) steps
must be taken to reduce the adverse effects of the bounty or grant; (2) there must be a
1979
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revision of the GATT. 61 The GATT system, unlike most legal systems
is not designed to exclude self-help. 66 Retaliation subject to established
procedures is the heart of the GATT system of enforcement. However,
the possibility that statutory adoption of a protectionist posture with
respect to countervailing duty impositions would unravel the inter-
woven system of tariff bindings is readily apparent. 67
As acknowledged in the Trade Act, the United States interests will
best be served through an international agreement to abolish non-tariff
barriers which distort world trade patterns. Central to the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations should be the establishment of
acceptable international rules governing the use of export subsidies. 6
The revision of the GATT to provide a case by case approach to ex-
port subsidization without the direct-indirect tax dichotomy would
focus concern on the question of whether the remission in fact had a
subsidizing effect. 69 This approach would be acceptable to American
negotiators as it would be neutral in application.70 American trading
partners relying heavily on indirect taxation for their revenue needs
will be reluctant to accept such an approach. They will argue that the
disparity in treatment of direct as opposed to indirect tax subsidies, in
the long-run, tends to adjust itself through price adjustments, ex-
change rate adjustments, and capital flow changes. 7
reasonable prospect of a new trade agreement, and (3) imposition of the countervailing
duty must be likely to jeopardize the successful completion of trade negotiations. 19
U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2) (1976).
65 See S. REP. No. 1209, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974).
66 K. DAMM, supra note 23, at 80.
67 Following the Customs Court decision, the Wall Street Journal quoted Special
Trade Representative, Robert Strauss, as saying: "There isn't any way I can overstate
the potential for destruction of the trading system posed by the Zenith Case." Wall St.
J., June 24, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
6 The Treasury presently views the following as "subsidies:"
1) Direct payments made by a foreign government to an exporter where the
effect is to improve the international competitiveness of such exports.
2) Rebates upon exportation of indirect taxes where the remission exceeds the
amount of tax originally assessed.
3) Multiple exchange rate systems involving a preferential rate for exports.
4) Rebates upon indirect taxes, where the tax paid was not directly related to
the product exported or components thereof.
Marks & Malmgren, supra note 20, at 348-49.
69 See K. DAMM, supra note 23, at 214.
70 Id.
"' See Barcel6, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 779, 813-15 (1977).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Should multilateral negotiations fail to provide the United States
with a satisfactory alternative to the GATT's present approach to in-
direct tax remissions, the Congress may be forced to provide a
statutory solution. 2 While it is true that an expanded statutory remedy
could result in retaliation by United States trading partners, use of this
device would focus attention on trade distortions created by subsidiza-
tion. This recognition could lead to the international community a
step closer towards revision of the GATT to provide some form of in-
ternational regulation of subsidization. Zenith's impact in this regard is
significant. The Supreme Court's unwillingness in Zenith, to expand
the protection afforded under the United States law may compel the
Congress, in the absence of an international accord and in face of in-
tensive lobbying by American manufacturers and labor interests, to
adopt a more protectionist posture with respect to foreign export sub-
sidies. It is the prospect of such action by the Congress which may pro-
vide American negotiators with their strongest bargaining chip in the
Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations.
Eric Garfinkel*
72 The Congress in the Trade Act clearly- recognized the need to protect
American manufacturers from subsidized foreign goods. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974) states:
The amendments to the existing law adopted by the Committee are designed
to balance the need for assuring effective protection of domestic interests
from foreign subsidies on the one hand with the need to afford some flexibili-
ty in the application of the United States law which is essential for achieving
a negotiated international agreement to the problems arising from the use of
subsidies and the impositions of countervailing duties.
* J.D. Candidate, Emory University, 1979.
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